Recent Cases by unknown
Volume 68 




Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra 
Recommended Citation 
Recent Cases, 68 DICK. L. REV. 454 (1964). 
Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra/vol68/iss4/9 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Dickinson Law Review by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more 
information, please contact lja10@psu.edu. 
RECENT CASES
THE BLANK SPACE VOTE CONTROVERSY IN THE
DEMOCRATIC SENATORIAL PRIMARY
In the case In re Primary Election April 28, 19641 the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court invalidated 5,624 votes cast in row "C," whose levers ap-
peared directly beneath the names of the Democratic senatorial candidates,
during the April 28th United States senatorial primary. The court reasoned
that these votes were improperly cast, because the voters failed to depress
the levers above the names of the Democratic candidates; therefore, these
votes could not be counted for either Genevieve Blatt, Michael Musmanno,
or David Roberts, all of whom were seeking the Democratic senatorial
nomination. Furthermore, the court said it would have to engage in sheer
speculation as to the voter's intent 2 in order to count these votes. It is the
purpose of this Case Note to examine whether the court was correct in in-
validating these controversial votes in view of (1) the physical appearance of
the machine, (2) the voter's intent, and (3) the case law and relevant statutes.
A detailed examination of the physical appearance of the voting machines
involved is necessary before a full consideration of the procedural and sub-
stantive aspects of this case is undertaken. Reference to the photographic
exhibit of the Jamestown type voting machine, used in thirteen of the fifteen
Philadelphia wards in question, is helpful. 3 The top row listed the titles of the
offices involved in the election. The second row, labeled "A," contained the
names of the Republican candidates, and the third row, labeled "B," listed the
names of the Democratic candidates. The fourth and fifth rows, labeled "C"
and "D" respectively were reserved for a special congressional election. Row
"C" was reserved for the Republican candidate and was distinguished by a long
horizontal arrow which extended the length of the machine to the name of the
Republican candidate. Row "D," the Democratic row, was similarly arranged.
A panel of levers designated "A," "B," "C," and "D" appeared horizontally
across the machine in the respective party rows above the names of the candi-
dates. It should be noted that the levers which appeared above and below the
names of the Democratic senatorial candidates were equidistant from these
1. 203 A.2d 212 (Pa. 1964).
2. No one knows or can determine, except by guessing, whether such votes, or
indeed any votes in the blank spaces in Republican row C, represented (1) pro-
test votes, or (2) nonpartisan votes, or (3) Republican votes, or (4) Democratic
votes, or (5) votes for Rovner, or (6) 'mistake' votes; but in any event, they
were illegally cast and were clearly and undoubtedly void votes!
203 A.2d at 216.
3. The rows in the Jamestown type machine, as illustrated in the photograph, are
arranged horizontally. Two wards used the Shoup type voting machines whose rows are
arranged vertically.
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Brief for Appellant, Exhibit B
Jamestown voting machine with voting Jamestown voting machine with voting
lever 3B depressed to register 'a vote for lever 3C depressed to register ,a number
candidate Roberts in the Democratic pri- in the blank column on Row C.
mary election.
Brief for Appellee, p. 5.
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names on the ballot. 4 Due to the negligence of certain election officials the
levers in row "C," which were directly beneath the names of the Democratic
candidates, and the levers in row "D," remained unlocked.5 "When a Demo-
cratic voter entered the polling booth, both the levers in panel "B"--above the
names of the Democratic candidates-and the levers in panel "C"-below the
names of the Democratic candidates-were unlocked, so that a Democratic
voter could depress and operate either the levers above or below the Democra-
tic candidates' names."8 A tabulation of the votes in those thirteen wards
which used the Jamestown machine indicated 2,094 votes were registered in
row "C" beneath the name of Genevieve Blatt, 181 votes registered in row "C"
underneath the name of David Roberts, and 3,349 votes were registered in row
"C" beneath the name of Michael Musmanno.7 Attorneys for Musmanno
4. Brief for Appellant, p. 29.
5. The Board of Elections justified its failure to lock the levers in row "C" on the
ground that it would have cost $3,000. The Board's action was in violation of the fol-
lowing provisions of the Election Code:
No voting machine shall, upon any examination or reexamination, be ap-
proved by the Secretary of the Commonwealth, or by any examinee appointed by
him, unless it shall, at the time, satisfy the following requirements:
(e) It shall preclude each voter from voting for any candidate ... for
whom . . . he is not entitled to vote, and from voting for more persons for any
office than he is entitled to vote for, and from voting for any candidate for the
same office ... more than once.
(f) It shall be capable of adjustment by election officers, so as to permit
each voter at a primary election to vote only for the candidate for nonpartisan
nomination, if any, and for the candidates seeking nomination by the political
party in which he is registered and enrolled, if he is enrolled as a member of a
political party, and so as to preclude him from voting for the candidate seeking
nomination by any political party in which he is not enrolled.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 3007(e), (f) (1963).
6. 203 A.2d at 225.
7. Brief for Appellant, Exhibit C.
ROW C TABULATIONS-JAMEsTowN VOTING MACHINES
Ward Blatt Roberts Musmanno
23 231 18 317
25 131 13 241
33 271 21 601
35 111 6 95
36 98 10 431
41 252 28 348
45 107 9 172
53 103 10 148
54 176 11 261
55 162 14 197
56 161 12 202
57 160 12 182
58 131 17 154
TOTALS 2094 181 3349
COLUMN C TABULATIONS--SHouP VOTING MACHINES
Ward Blatt Roberts Musmanno
43 24 7 14
49 37 9 23
TOTALS 61 16 37
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urged that the votes recorded in row "C" beneath the names of the Democra-
tic candidates should be counted, because the clear intention of the voters
depressing levers beneath the candidates' names was to cast a vote for them.
The court of common pleas affirming the decision of the Philadelphia County
Board of Elections, rejected this argument and refused to count these votes, on
the grounds that they were improperly cast. The court also questioned whether
the voters intended these votes to be cast for the Democratic candidates. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court on the
same reasoning. The court refused to reconsider their decision8 and furthermore
refused to stay the certification of Blatt's name on the ballot.9 Justice Brennan
of the United States Supreme Court also refused to stay the certification of
the winning candidate's name on the ballot. 10 The United States Supreme
Court denied certiorari."
Before a consideration of pertinent case law is undertaken it is necessary
to discuss two key issues which form the crux of this decision. First, was the
Election Code violated by depressing the levers beneath the candidate's name
instead of depressing the levers above the candidate's name? Second, did the
voters who depressed the lever beneath the name of a Democratic candidate
manifest an intention to cast a vote for this candidate?
The Pennsylvania Election Code specifically enumerates the proper
manner in which a voter should operate a voting machine at a primary elec-
tion. The Code provides: "At primaries, he shall vote for each candidate
individually by operating the key, handle, pointer or knob, upon or adjacent
to which the name of such candidate is placed."'2 In deciding whether the
controversial votes were properly cast, the interpretation of the phrase "upon
or adjacent to which the name of such candidate is placed" is crucial.
Justice Jones, speaking for the minority, argued that "'upon' refers to the
lever directly above the name of the candidate and that 'adjacent' refers either
to the lever below or the lever above the name of the candidate, because both
levers are 'adjacent' to the candidate's name."' 13 Noting that the statutory
language is at best uncertain, ambiguous, and confusing, the dissenters sug-
gested that "the statute must be construed in the manner most favorable to
the voter.' '1 4 According to the dissenters, the operation of the levers in row
"C" beneath the names of the Democratic candidates was not a clear violation
8. 151 The Legal Intelligencer 1 (Aug. 13, 1964).
9. Philadelphia Inquirer, Sept. 1, 1964, p. 25, col. 2.
10. Id. Sept. 5, 1964, p. 3, col. 1. Genevieve Blatt was finally certified by the State
Elections Bureau as the Democratic nominee for the United States Senate. She main-
tained a 491 vote lead over Michael Musmanno. Id. Sept. 9, 1964, p. 8, col. 3.
11. 32 U.S.L. WEEK 3129-30 (1964).
12. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 3056(d) (1963). (Emphasis added.)




of the Election Code, thus, the controversial votes should have been counted.
However, the majority ruled that the votes in question were illegally cast and
therefore void; the statute being clear and realistic.
The word "upon" clearly covers and, we repeat, applies to the present
Jamestown machine; the word "adjacent" would cover and apply to a
different machine known as the Shoup machine, where the pointer
and appropriate voting space is, we repeat, on the right of and next to
the candidate's name.1
5
Although the majority view appears to be the most logical, it fails to account
for the situation in Pittsburgh, where the proper lever to pull on the James-
town type machine is the one below the candidate's name. 16 Furthermore, there
is nothing to indicate that these two types of machines were in existence
and contemplated by the Legislature at the time the statute was enacted.
17
Thus, it is apparent that both interpretations illustrate the ambiguity of the
statute; therefore, the question of whether the voters improperly cast their
ballots should not be answered with the statute as the only source of reference.
If the instructions on the sample ballot are examined and then the physical
appearance of the voting machine, it becomes clear that the proper manner to
vote for any of the Democratic senatorial candidates is to pull down the lever
directly above their names. The instructions on the sample ballot clearly
indicate the correct voting procedure. They are as follows:
Instructions to Voter
2nd. Turn down a pointer over the name of each candidate in your




and leave it there.
(You will note on the ballot that the Republican Party occupies the
first horizontal row, the Democratic Party the second horizontal
row. ... Just remember to turn down a pointer over the name of each
candidate you wish to vote for .... a8
While the dissent urged that there was no evidence that the voters received
15. 203 A.2d at 230.
16. Democratic County Committee of Philadelphia, on Behalf of Michael A. Mus-
manno, v. County Board of Elections of Philadelphia County, Oct. Term, 1964, No. 391,
United States Supreme Court, Petition for Writ of Certiorari to The Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania, p. 5.
17. 203 A.2d at 230.
18. Id. at 215.
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the sample ballot and that the face of the sample ballot was distinguishable 19
from that of the voting machine, the above quoted language clearly should have
informed the voters to depress the lever above the candidate's name in the
appropriate party row. Although there is some likelihood that a voter would
mistakingly depress the lever below the candidate's name, 20 a close examination
of the picture of the machine will illustrate that any voter using a reasonable
degree of care would depress the proper lever. In the first place, heavy black
lines clearly distinguish the Democratic row "B" and the special election
Republican row "C." Secondly, within each row adjacent to the alphabetical
marking of each row is a set of index fingers clearly pointing to the panel of
levers which should be depressed in order to cast a vote in the respective party
row desired. Although the levers on rows "B" and "C" are equidistant from
the name of the Democratic senatorial candidates, the physical appearance of
the ballot clearly indicates that the lever above the name of the Democratic
candidate should be depressed in order to vote for such candidate. Therefore,
it is submitted that the voters improperly cast their ballots in view of (1) the
physical arrangement of the ballot (2) the clearly worded instructions on the
specimen ballot, and (3) the statutory direction that the voter "shall vote for
each candidate individually by operating the key, handle, pointer or knob, upon
... which the name of such candidate is placed."
'2 1
The most compelling argument advanced by the appellant and dissent
involves the intent of the voters. Language indicating that where the intent of
the voter can be ascertained the ballot should not be rejected for minor ir-
regularities is cited numerous times by the appellant in its brief to the Penn-
19. On the specimen ballot, the levers are shown in the ballot label wherein
appeared the candidates' names; on the machine the levers were outside the
ballot labels. On the specimen ballot, in the Democratic column and below the
word "Democratic," was the letter "B" followed by a pointing hand which did
not point to any row of levers; on the voting machines, the letter "B" is
above the word "Democratic" and the pointing hand points to the levers in panel
"B." A comparison of the specimen ballot and the face of the voting machine
readily indicates the non-conformity of the former with the latter.
Id. at 233-34 (dissenting opinion).
20. To illustrate the confusing nature of the appearance of the voting machines
appellants, in their brief, made reference to an incident which occurred during a hearing
before Judge Carroll. Judge Carroll asked the counsel for the Board of Elections to
point out the levers in the "C" panel. Counsel, by mistake, depressed a lever in the "D"
row. Brief for Appellant, pp. 5-6.
Furthermore, in Peck v. Lackawana County Board of Elections, 44 Lack. Jurist 97
(1942) the court recognized this mistake when they said:
The unfortunate and repeated occurrence of a candidate losing hundreds of
votes intended for him by well intending voters pulling a lever over a blank
space under his name will be corrected by the ballot label set-up proposed for
use in this election.
Id. at 98.
21. Although the term "adjacent" is omitted in this quotation of the statute, the




sylvania Supreme Court. All the cases in which the voter's intent was con-
sidered paramount are distinguishable from the case at hand, for in those cases
the voter properly cast his ballot; but due to a mechanical defect in the
voting machine, or surplusage placed on the ballot by the voter, or a mis-
spelling of the candidate's name, there was doubt for whom the voter intended
to cast his ballot.22 Certainly, if the intent of the voter could be ascertained
without speculation, then the vote should be counted. However, can the
intent of the voter be ascertained without speculation in this case?
Petitioners maintain that since the votes cast on row C which had
no nominees were in closest proximity to row B, on which their
names appeared, it is logical to infer that those who cast their votes
on row C did it by error in that they pulled down the knobs under
the names of petitioners instead of the names over them. Practical
experience has demonstrated that there may be much force in that
argument. Nevertheless, it is not the only inference to be drawn. No
one knows what voters cast their votes on row C. If it were done by
error, rather than by design, then not even the voters who did so,
could now so state, since they are probably without knowledge that
they did so. There is no way of telling whether those who cast their
votes on row C did so designedly, because they had no intention of
voting for either of the two major parties' nominees.
23
22. The appellee adopted these classifications from the lower court's opinion and
distinguished these cases in a lengthy discussion. Brief for Appellee, pp. 26-33.
a. Surplusage Cases: In these cases the voter made" a proper mark in the proper
voting square, and made some additional marks. The courts held that this surplusage did
not invalidate the vote. See generally Reading Election Recount Case, 410 Pa. 62, 188
A.2d 254 (1963) (ballots marked properly, but they contained surplus crosses and
checks, or words "yes" or "no") ; Norwood Election Contest Case, 382 Pa. 547, 116 A.2d
552 (1955) (ballot contained a check mark in addition to a cross mark in the proper
voting square) ; Bauman Election Contest Case, 351 Pa. 451, 41 A.2d 630 (1945) (ballots
were marked with an "X" in the proper voting square, but contained additional check
marks after the square and in one ballot the words "no good" written after the candi-
dates name) ; James Appeal, 377 Pa. 405, 105 A.2d 64 (1954) (ballots contained printed
name of Samuel A. James, and sticker affixed to ballot with name of Samuel A. James
affixed to ballot and "X" marked after name of James on sticker).
b. Misspelling Cases: In these cases the voter complied with the write-in provisions
of the Election Code, but spelled the candidates name incorrectly. The courts agreed to
count these votes. See generally McCracken Appeal, 370 Pa. 562, 88 A.2d 787 (1952)
(voter wrote Joseph Kratochvil, instead of Joseph Kratochvil, Jr.,) ; Harer's Petition,
49 Pa. D. & C. 344 (1943) (various spellings of the candidate's name).
c. Mechanical Defect Cases: In these cases the voter depressed the proper lever, but
due to a mechanical defect the votes did not register for the candidate they voted for. See
generally Miraglia Appeal, 1 Pa. D. & C.2d 717 (1954) (machine failed to make certain
perforations on paper roll to distinguish whether write-in votes were cast by a Republican
or Democratic voter): McGallagher v. Bosarge, 273 Ala. 133, 136 So.2d 181 (1961)
(ballot labels misplaced on machine, but they were so arranged that it was possible to
correlate the names of the candidates on the face of the machine with the votes registered
on the counters in the back of the machines).
23. Application of Lester, 127 N.Y.S.2d 272, 276 (1953). The factual situation is
almost identical with the case under discussion in that the voters improperly depressed
levers beneath the candidates' names. This case will be discussed in detail, infra.
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A statistical analysis also affirms the view that the intent of the voters
is not clear. Although over 5,000 votes were cast under the names of the
Democratic senatorial candidates, numerous votes were cast in other blank
spaces in row "C." In the two columns immediately to the left of the space
reserved for the name of the Republican candidate in the special congressional
election row, a total of 268 votes were cast in the first column and 466 votes in
the second. 24 Furthermore, in row "A" there were three columns reserved for
the election of delegates to the Republican National Convention.2 5 Although
these columns were blank in row "B" and row "C," there were totals of 251,
311 and 151 votes respectively cast in these three columns in row "C."26 Thus,
a total of 1447 votes were cast in row "C" underneath no names. Such a large
amount of indiscriminate voting casts an aurora of doubt on the intent of the
voter who cast his vote underneath the names of the Democratic senatorial
candidates3 t In fact, the majority reasoned that the 5,624 votes in question
could be interpreted in six different ways.
Some voters pulled down levers into the miscalled blank row C,-a
Republican Row,-under three spaces in Row B (the Row above C)
where a Democrat's name appeared and some levers under five
spaces in row B, where no candidates' names appeared in Row B.
These are the votes which are challenged in this appeal. No one knows
or can determine,-except by guessing,-whether such votes, or indeed
any votes in the blank spaces in Republican Row C, represented (1)
protest votes, or (2) nonpartisan votes, or (3) Republican votes,
or (4) Democratic votes, or (5) votes for Rovner, or (6) 'mistake'
votes; but in any event, they were illegally cast and were clearly and
undoubtedly void votes. Moreover, there were several voting ma-
chines in which no votes were cast in Row B, but votes cast in Rows
A and C. This would indicate that these particular voting machines
were used only by Republicans and nonpartisans.2 8
Although the dissent argues that the majority view, indicating that these
votes were possibly "protest," "cross-over," or "mistake" votes, "is based on
conjecture and not upon proof of the quality upon which a judicial decree can
be predicated," 29 the same can be said for the dissenting view which alleges
these votes in controversy were cast for the Democratic candidates. It is
submitted that a court should not engage in any form of speculation as to the
voter's intent.
Before consideration of relevant case law is undertaken, it must be noted
24. Brief for Appellee, pp. 16a-17a.
25. Refer to the photographic exhibit of the Jamestown voting machine.
26. Brief for Appellee, p. 17a.
27. Id. at 16.
28. 203 A.2d at 216.
29. Id. at 234.
1964]
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that only those cases in which the voter improperly cast his ballot are in point.
Decisions involving paper ballots will be discussed first, followed by voting
machine cases.
Contested Election of Flynn"° is cited by the majority as the controlling
case. The three paper ballots in question each contained the name of Edward J.
Burke with a square to the right of his name in which the voter was to insert an
"X" if he desired to vote for Burke. Above the name of Burke in separate rows
were the instructional phrases-"Council-( Mark one)." Beneath Burke's
name was a blank space, and to the right of that space, a square. None of the
three ballots in question were marked with an "X" in the square to the right
of Burke's name. The first ballot contained the figure "1" in the square to the
right of Burke's name; the second contained the figure "1" in the square to the
right of Burke's name and an "X" in the square beneath the square containing
the figure "1," and the third ballot contained an "X" in the square adjacent to
the blank space beneath the name of Edward J. Burke.31 The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court, in applying the Election Code of 1893,32 which specifically
stated that the voter was to insert a cross mark in the square to the right of
the candidate's name, held these votes were invalid, because the voter had not
complied with the express statutory provisions.
30. 181 Pa. 457, 37 Ati. 523 (1892).
31. The factual situation may be diagrammed as follows:
Id. at 458.
32. Pa. Laws 1893, 419.














be so printed as to give to each voter a clear oppor-
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Not one of these ballots is marked according to law .... To hold that
the ballots in question are valid is to set aside the plain provisions
of the act prescribing the place and manner of "marking," and to sub-
stitute therefor the surmises of the election officers and courts respect-
ing the intention of the voter. The presumption is that the voter knows
where and how to mark his ballot. He is furnished on his request with
a cad of instruction and a specimen ballot, and if by reason of any
disability he desires assistance in the preparation of his ballot he is
permitted to select a qualified elector of the district to aid him in the
preparation of it. Compliance with the provisions of the [Aict of
1893 furnishes the only safe guide to the intention of the voter, and
the facilities afford for such compliance are quite sufficient to render
noncompliance inexcusable.
33
The fact situation in Flynn was similar to that in the present controversy, a
vote cast in a blank space beneath the name of a candidate. Although it was
argued that the intent of the voter was clear, the court ruled that the only
safeguard of the voter's intent is strict compliance with the Election Code.
The present election statute is similar to the one involved in Flynn, with
respect to directions for the marking of paper ballots ;34 thus, Flynn is applica-
ble. It must be granted that the Election Code language concerning the manner
of voting on machines is not as clear as the statutory provisions concerning
paper ballots; however, if we assume that in the present case the voters improp-
erly cast their ballots, then the Flynn decision and the reasoning behind it
should be accorded great weight. Other jurisdictions which have considered
problems similar to those in Flynn have followed that decision.3 5
tunity to designate his choice of candidates by a cross-mark (X) in a square of
sufficient size at the right of the name of each candidate and inside the line en-
closing the column, and in like manner answers to the questions submitted by
similar marks in squares at the right of the words "yes" and "no", and on the
ballot may be printed instructions how to mark, and such words as will aid the
voter to do this, as "mark one", "mark three", and the like.
Sect 22 . . . and shall prepare his ballot by marking, if he desires to vote for
every candidate of a political party, a cross in the circle above the column of such
party, if otherwise he shall mark in the appropriate margin or place a cross (X)
opposite the party name or political designation, or a group of candidates for
presidential electors, and opposite the name of the candidate of his choice for
each other office to be filled, according to the number of persons to be voted for
by him for each office, or by inserting in the blank space provided therefor any
name not already on the ballot ....
33. 181 Pa. 457, 459-60, 36 At. 523, 524 (1892).
34. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 3055(b) (1963).
At primaries, the elector shall prepare his ballot in the following manner:
He shall vote for the candidates of his choice for nomination or election, accord-
ing to the number of persons to be voted for by him, for each office, by making a
cross (X) or check (,V) mark in the square opposite the name of the candidate,
or he may insert by writing, stamping or sticker, in the blank space provided
therefor, any name not already printed on the ballot, and such insertion shall
count as a vote without the making of a cross (X) or check (N/) mark.
35. See generally Hunt v. Campbell, 19 Ariz. 254, 169 Pac. 596 (1917) ; Prene-
vorst v. Delorme, 129 Minn. 359, 152 N.W. 758 (1915) ; Carwile v. Jones, '38
Mont. 590, 101 Pac. 153 (1909) ; Flanders v. Roberts, 182 Mass. 524, 65 N.E. 902
1964]
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The Pennsylvania courts have previously considered situations where the
voter has improperly cast his ballot by failing to comply with the write-in
provisions of the Election Code. In McCowin's Appeal"8 the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania invalidated a ballot which contained a sticker pasted and
affixed to the ballot in such a manner that it covered the title of the offices and
directions for the insertion of write-in ballots. The sticker itself contained this
information and the name of the proposed candidate. Since the prescribed
procedure for casting write-in votes was to insert the name in the blank space
provided for it, the court reasoned that covering of the entire column with
additional information was a violation of the election statute.
3 7
The position of the cross mark on the ballot has been considered of great
importance, and non-compliance with the specific statutory provisions has
resulted in the invalidation of the ballot in question. Thus, in In re Municipal
Election Held Nov. 3, 1953, Hopewell Township,38 a ballot containing a cross
mark immediately in back of the name of a candidate, rather than in the square
provided for it, was ruled invalid. The Hopewell Township case, decided in
1953, is a reaffirmation of the policies set forth in such early decisions as East
Coventry Election.89 Here, a ballot which was marked with a cross on the
space between the heavy lines designating the columns of candidates to be voted
for was ruled defective. Furthermore a ballot marked with a cross outside of
and to the right of the circle used to designate a straight party vote was ruled
invalid, for the voter failed to comply with the provisions of the Election Code.
The court noted the dangers involved if the voter adopted some other method
of voting than that provided by statute, saying:
When he is permitted to depart from these and adopt some other
method, and the election officer undertakes to ascertain the intention
of the elector from something else he has done, the officer has nothing
to guide him but conjecture. 40
A final group of Pennsylvania paper-ballot cases were concerned with
the situation where the voter has indicated a vote for a straight party ticket by
(1903); O'Connell v. Mathews, 177 Mass. 518, 59 N.E. 195 (1901). Contra,
Thompson v. Boling, 240 Ky. 340, 42 S.W.2d 321 (1931).
36. 165 Pa. 233, 30 At. 955 (1895).
37. Pa. Laws 1893, 419 provides:
Sect. 14. There shall be left at the right of the groups of candidates for presiden-
tial elections, and of the lists of candidates for other officers, (or under the title
of the office itself for which an election is to be held in case there be no candi-
dates legally nominated therefor), as many blank spaces as there are persons to
be voted for, by each voter for such office, in which spaces the voter may insert
the name of any person whose name is not printed on the ballot as a candidate
for such office, and such insertion shall count as a vote without the cross-mark
hereinafter mentioned.
38. 4 Cumb. 145 (1953).
39. 3 Pa. Dist. 377 (1894).
40. Id. at .378.
[ Vol. 68
RECENT CASES
marking. the appropriate square and has also marked the squares opposite the
names of certain individuals in the same party column. Pfaff v. Bacon41 held
these ballots invalid, reasoning that the intention to vote a straight party ticket
was not clear. Furthermore, the voter had improperly cast his ballot, since the
court interpreted the Election Code to provide he could vote a straight party
ticket by either placing a cross mark in the party square, or by placing a cross
mark in the square opposite the names of all the candidates in the party
column.
42
In Daily's Appeal43 a ballot containing a cross mark in the Democratic
party column, and the name of a write-in candidate for the office of school
director with a mark adjacent to his name, was ruled invalid, on the ground
that the voter was attempting to vote for two candidates for an office to which
one was to be elected.
In Newberry Township Election44 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in-
validated three ballots where the voter, after marking the Republican party
square, erased the names of the candidates in the Republican column for certain
offices, and placed a check mark in the square opposite the names of the
Democratic candidates for these same offices. Explicit directions on the top of
the ballot informed voters who did not want to vote a straight party ticket, not
to mark the circle appearing within the party column. These above discussed
cases seem to indicate that the courts will invalidate a vote where the voter by
his own act improperly cast his ballot.
45
A line of New York cases in which voters improperly cast their ballots
41. 249 Pa. 297, 95 Atl. 71 (1915).
42. Id. at 305-06, 95 Atl. at 74.
43. 232 Pa. 540, 81 Atl. 655 (1911).
44. 187 Pa. 297, 40 At. 822 (1898).
45. The present Election Code encompasses the factual situations involved in the
past three cited cases and provides that those votes would be valid if cast under the
present code. However, these cases are important to indicate that the Pennsylvania
courts have invalidated votes when they have been cast in violation of the election stat-
utes. The present Election Code provides:
If he desires to vote for every candidate of a political party or political body,
except its candidates for offices as to which he votes for individual candidates in
the manner hereinafter provided, he may make a cross (X) or check (-/) mark
in the square opposite the name of the party or political body of his choice in
the party column on the left of the ballot, and every such cross (X) or check
(N/) mark shall be equivalent to and be counted as a vote for every candidate of
a party or political body so marked, including its candidates for presidential
electors, except for those offices as to which he has indicated a choice for individ-
ual candidates of the same or another party or political body, by making a
cross (X) or check (-/) mark opposite their names in the manner hereinabove
provided, as to which offices his ballot shall be counted only for the candidates
which he has thus individually marked, notwithstanding the fact that he made a
mark in the party column, and even though in the case of an office for which
more than one candidate is to voted for, he has not individually marked for such
office the full number of candidates for which he is entitled to vote.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, §3055(c) (1963).
1964]
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on voting machines is of great importance. Application of Lester 6 is almost
directly on all fours with the present case. The ballot on the machine was
arranged so that row "A" was reserved for the Republican candidate for
township offices, row "B" for the Democratic candidates, and row "C" for
the Liberal party which had no candidates. The first three knobs of row "C"
were locked and the remainder were unlocked. A substantial number of votes
were cast on row "C" on the lines of the ballot which contained names in nom-
ination on rows "A" and "B." These votes were registered as blank votes. The
court held it had no power to order the votes registered in row "C" to be
counted for the petitioner, and further suggested that his remedy lay in quo
warranto rather than in a summary proceeding before the court. The following
language indicates the court's position.
Petitioners maintain that since the votes cast on row C which had
no nominees were in closest proximity to row B, on which three
names appeared, it is logical to infer that those who cast their votes
on row C did it by error in that they pulled down the knobs under
the names of petitioners instead of the names over them. Practical
experience has demonstrated that there may be much force in that
argument. Nonetheless, it is not the only inference to be drawn. No
one knows what voters cast their votes on row C. If it were done by
error, rather than by design, then not even the voters who did so,
could now so state, since they are probably without knowledge that
they did so. There is no way of telling whether those who cast their
votes in row C did so designedly, because they had no intention of
voting for either of the two major parties' nominees. Moreover, the
Court is without power to take oral testimony of the voters to
ascertain their intention.
47
In In re Cosgrove,48 the voting machine was improperly set-up so that
line "A" contained the title of the offices to be voted on, with the respective
party candidates of the Republican, Democratic, and American Labor parties
listed on lines "B," "C," and "D" respectively. The names of the candidates
of the Republican, Democratic and American Labor parties should have
been on lines "A," "B," and "C" respectively. Line "B" was distinguished by
a pointing finger, the Republican emblem, and a large "A." There was a
similar arrangement on the Democratic and American Labor party lines. The
court, held that the voter's intent was not clear, and that votes cast on line "A"
were improperly counted for the Republican candidates.
As to the eight votes cast on line A above referred to, the court
finds, after an examination of the voting machines in question, that
46. 127 N.Y.S.2d 272 (1953).
47. Id. at 276.
48. 46 N.Y.S.2d 195 (1944).
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it is impossible to determine the intent of those voters, and the said
eight votes, therefore, must be disregarded and not counted for
either candidate.
49
The reason crucial to the Lester and Cosgrove decisions was the intent of the
voter, and according to those courts, the intent was not clear. The unclear
intent factor also forms the basis for the majority opinion in the case under
discussion.
50
In re Creedon5' also illustrates the reluctance of the New York courts
to ascertain the intent of the voter by guess work. Here, three voting machines
were improperly adjusted so that a vote cast for either candidate, Walsh or
Thomas, registered as a vote for both. The court ruled all the votes cast on these
machines invalid, because it was not possible to tell how the votes were
divided between Walsh and Thomas and therefore, not possible to fairly ap-
portion them. Although the voters properly cast their votes and the court
expressed the view that a mechanical defect in a machine would not invali-
date a vote, the court still refused to engage in any form of speculation as to
the intent of the voter.
Two recent decisions in the Pennsylvania courts, invalidating improperly
cast write-in votes on voting machines, reaffirm the principles enunciated in
the aforementioned New York decisions. In Weber Appeal5 2 the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court invalidated sixteen write-in votes which were affixed to a
folded card inserted in the write-in slot on the machine. If the card had not
jammed the machine, the voters would have been able to affix their stickers on
the paper roll of the machine and all sixteen stickers would have been evenly
spaced on the roll, instead of being placed on top of each other on the card.
The court held that a misplaced sticker on a voting machine has no legal
effect. 53 Indicative of the policy adopted by the court, is the view that "tech-
nicalities of the Election Law (and there are many) are necessary for the
preservation of the secrecy and purity of the ballot and must, therefore, be
meticulously observed." 54 In In re Appeal of Bert Transue from Returns
of County Board of Elections,55 a write-in ballot for the office of school
49. Id. at 196.
50. 203 A.2d at 216.
51. 264 N.Y. 40, 189 N.E. 773 (1934).
52. 399 Pa. 37, 159 A.2d 901 (1960).
53. The write-in provisions of the Election Code provide:
A voter may, at any primary or election, vote for any person for any office,
for which office his name does not appear upon the voting machine as a candidate,
by an irregular ballot containing the name of such person deposited, written
or affixed in or upon the appropriate receptacle or device provided in or on the
machine for that purpose, and in no other manner .
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 3056(e) (1963).
54. 399 Pa. at 44, 159 A.2d at 905.
55. 35 North. 329 (1962).
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director was ruled invalid when it was affixed in the column reserved for the
township supervisor. The court held that a write-in or sticker vote is only
effective for the office in which it appears. The court also refused to count a
spot on the paper roll which was urged to be the affixing of a sticker, as a vote
for the petitioner. The court reasoned that the evidence was equally balanced
that the voter removed the sticker, voted for someone other than Transue, or
did vote for Transue. "To count the glue mark as a vote for the appellant
would be too speculative under the circumstances.
' 56
In summary, it is evident from a consideration of the physical appearance
of the machine, the uncertain intent of the voters and the relevant case law,
that the majority's views are substantially sound ones.57 It is doubtful that a
similar situation will arise again in Pennsylvania. The case does point out that
the Election Code, with respect to its explanation of the proper procedure to
follow for voting on machines, is somewhat confusing. It is suggested that
the statute be amended, so as to provide clear directions for the operation of
both the Shoup and Jamestown type machines. Furthermore, it should be a
statutory requirement that clear instructions on the operation of the machines
be placed on the ballots that are affixed to the machines. Finally, some procedure
should be adopted by local election boards in conjunction with party com-
mittees to insure the voters of the commonwealth that all machines will be
properly adjusted, so that possible confusion and litigation may be avoided in
the future.
ROBERTf H. MILLER
56. Id. at 333.
57. The majority summarized their views as follows:
To summarize: In order to reach its conclusion, appellant misinterprets or ig-
nores (1) the clear (pertinent) election laws, and (2) the set-up of election
machines which are clear to everyone except to a careless or an absent-minded
or a hurried or an unthinking voter, and (3) the marked sample ballots which
contain (a) very brief, clearly worded instructions, instructing a voter twice
in clear, simple, brief language which lever to pull down in order to vote for the
Democrat or Republican candidate of his choice, as well as (b) a crystally clear
illustration, and (4) the words at the left end of row (C) which state in small
capital letters "SPECIAL ELECTION" and in very large capital letters
"REPUBLICAN," and (5) the line through the middle of row C, with an arrow
at the right end where the name of the candidate, Edward H. Rovner, ap-
pears, and (6) many prior decisions of this Court which, we repeat, in principle
directly rule the instant case. Furthermore, appellant has not been deprived of any
right ordained or guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States.
203 A.2d at 219.
FEDERAL IMMUNITY FROM STATE TAXATION
In 1819, in M'Culloch v. Maryland,' Chief Justice John Marshall wrote
that "the power to tax involves the power to destroy" the effectiveness of our
system of federal government, and "that there is a plain repugnance, in con-
ferring on one government power to control the constitutional measures of
another, which other, with respect to those very measures, is declared to be
supreme over that which exerts the control .... "2 Therefore, the Supreme
Court of the United States reasoned that the Constitution must impliedly
exempt from state taxation the means and instrumentalities by which the
federal government carries out its functions.3 This sweeping decision has been
subjected to endless interpretation, both at federal and state levels, so that its
meaning is now uncertain.
The question of federal immunity from state taxation was again raised
in Pennsylvania on July 3, 1962, when the Pennsylvania Department of Rev-
enue, with the approval of the Department of the Auditor General, made a
resettlement of the gross receipts tax of the Philadelphia Electric Company.
This resulted in an increase of the company's tax by $42,643.26. 4 This increase
was due to a state tax levied by the Tax Department on gross receipts arising
out of the company's sales of electricity to the federal government. In issuing
the resettlement, the Pennsylvania tax authorities did not follow the decision
of Commonwealth v. Philadelphia Electric Company,5 which held such sales
not taxable under the same statute here involved. 6 This decision had not
been questioned by the taxing authorities until 1962. The resettlement was
appealed to the commonwealth court 7 and the question of federal immunity from
state taxation has again been opened.
The applicable statute reads in pertinent part as follows:
Every . . . electric light company . . . engaged in . . . electric and
power . . . business in this Commonwealth, shall pay to the State
Treasurer, through the Department of Revenue, a tax of fourteen
mills . . . upon each dollar of gross receipts of said corporation
received from ... the sales of electric energy .... 8
Essentially, the appellant, Philadelphia Electric Company, relied solely
1. M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
2. Id. at 429.
3. Ibid.
4. The resettlement was made by authority of PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 1105
(1962) (Fiscal Code).
5. 36 Dauph. 274 (1932).
6. PA. STAT.' ANN. tit. 72, § 2181 (1962). (Gross Receipts Tax Act).
7. Commonwealth v. Philadelphia Electric Co., argued before Com. Pleas Ct. of
Dauphin Co., March 18, 1964, decision not yet rendered.
8. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 2181 (1962).
469
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
on the authority of Commonwealth v. Philadelphia Electric Company9 in as-
serting its claim of immunity. The court in that case considered the same
question involved here: "[W]hether the State is entitled to tax on the receipts
from sale of electricity to the United States Government . . . ."10 Judge
Hargest wrote: "We think it is too plain for serious argument that the Com-
monwealth is not entitled to the tax on the receipts from sale of electricity to
the United States Government."" The court based its conclusion on the au-
thority of Williams v. Talladega,12 which held that a state could not indirectly
tax telegraph messages of the federal government, and Panhandle Oil Co. v.
Knox,'3 holding that a tax on gasoline measured at so many cents a mile was
void as applied to instrumentalities of the United States.
Without going into the soundness of the 1932 Phila. Electric Co. decision
it seems quite obvious that for many years it has had no real foundation. The
Panhandle case was explicitly overruled in 1941,14 and the Williams case was
stripped of all authority by Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Texas Co.15 Thus, the
Phila. Electric Co. case of 1932 represents little authority today.
The gradual but steady narrowing of the M'Culloch decision can be seen
by an historical survey of the cases interpreting it. The earliest cases liberally
interpreted M'Culloch, saying that the states were restrained from taxing
when the tax would act "upon the instruments, emoluments, and persons
which the United States may use and employ as necessary and proper means
to execute their sovereign powers. The Government of the United States is
supreme within its sphere of action."' 6 This "sphere of action" was apparently
quite wide, as illustrated by the fact that the Supreme Court held the salary of
a captain on a United States revenue-cutter to be exempt from county taxes
because he was a means by which the federal government carried out its func-
tions.17 Later cases established the general rule that salaries of all federal em-
ployees were exempt from state taxation."8 This trend of cases was not checked
until 1939.19 Thus, the. earliest reaction to M'Culloch was to broadly construe
9. 36 Dauph. 274 (1932).
10. Id. at 275.
11. Ibid.
12. 226 U.S. 404 (1912).
13. 277 U.S. 218 (1928).
14. Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U.S. 1 (1941).
15. 336 U.S. 342, 358-59 (1949).
16. Dobbins v. Comm'rs of Erie County, 41 U.S. 370, 373 (1842).
17. Ibid.
18. New York ex rel. Rogers v. Graves, 299 U.S. 401 (1937) ; First Nat'l Bank v.
Kentucky, 76 U.S. 353 (1869). See also Austin v. Aldermen of Boston, 74 U.S. 694
(1868) ; Van Allen v. The Assessors, 70 U.S. 573 (1865) ; Weston v. City Council, 27
U.S. 449 (1829).
19. State Tax Comm'r v. Van Cott, 306 U.S. 511 (1939). Weston v. City Council,
27 U.S. 171 (1820), using similar philosophy, held stock issued for loans made to the
United States Government was exempt from taxation by states. This rule was carried on
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it. Federal exemptions arose every time a state or local tax came into contact
with a federal activity-regardless of how remote the contact or how im-
perceptible the effect on the government.
The Supreme Court eventually came to realize that the rule was too
broad and began to search for a narrower but still effective theory of exemption.
The first open recognition of the inadequacy of the rule came in First Nat'l
Bank v. Kentucky20 where, in referring to the M'Culloch doctrine, the Court
said:
But the doctrine has its foundation in the proposition, that the
right of taxation may be so used in such cases as to destroy the in-
strumentalities by which the government proposes to effect its lawful
purposes in the states .... The most important agents of the [f] ederal
government are its officers, but no one will contend that when a man
becomes an officer of the government he ceases to be subject to the
laws of the [s] tate. The principle we are dicussing has its limitation,
a limitation growing out of the necessity on which the principle itself
is founded. That limitation is, that the agencies of the [f]ederal
government are only exempt from state legislation so far as that
legislation may interfere with, or impair their efficiency in performing
the functions by which they are designed to serve the government.
Any other rule would convert a principle founded alone in the neces-
sity of securing to the [G]overnment of the United States the means
of exercising its legitimate powers, into an unauthorized and unjustifi-
able invasion of the rights of the [sltates.
2 1
In the subsequent case of Thomson v. Pacific R.R.,2 the question arose
as to whether a road, constructed by a private corporation under the direction
and authority of Congress for use by the United States, is exempt from state
taxation as an instrument of the Government? Referring to M'Culloch and
cases following it, the Court said:
In all these cases, as in the case of the Bank of the United States,
exemption from liability to taxation was maintained upon the same
ground. The state tax held to be repugnant to the Constitution was
imposed directly upon an operation or an instrument of the govern-
ment.
We freely recognize the soundness of the doctrine, that no state
has a "right to tax the means employed by the government of the
Union for the execution of its powers." But we think there is a clear
distinction between the means employed by the government and the
property of agents employed by the government. Taxation of the
by such cases as Bank of Commerce v. Comm'rs of Taxes, 67 U.S. 620 (1862), and was
finally made statutory law. 12 Stat. 346 (1862), as amended, 31 U.S.C. 742 (Supp. III,
1959).
20. 76 U.S. 353 (1869).
21. Id. at 361-62.
22. 76 U.S. 579 (1869).
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agency is taxation of the means; taxation of the property of the agent
is not always, or generally, taxation of the means.
No one questions that the power to tax all property, business,
and persons .. .is original in the [sItates and has never been sur-
rendered. It cannot be so used, indeed, so as to defeat or hinder the
operations of the [n]ational government; but it will be safe to con-
clude, in general, . . . that when Congress has not interposed to
protect their property from [s]tate taxation, such taxation is not
obnoxious to that objective.
28
Thus, the Supreme Court has made it clear that the exemption is not universal,
but it failed to set up an effective test by which courts could determine when the
federal exemption should apply. The Thomson decision rested on the arbitrary
distinction of whether the corporation had a state or national charter.
It remained for Union Pac. R.R. v. Penniston24 to establish the first
workable test. Showing the error of reasoning in the Thomson case, the
court said:
But when the question is ...whether the taxation of property is
taxation of means, instruments or agencies by which the United
States carries out its powers, it is impossible to see how it can be
pertinent to inquire whence the property originated . . . . If the
tax ... is unlawful, it is because the [s]tates cannot obstruct the
exercise of [n]ational powers .
2
The Court painstakingly laid the groundwork for the new test by pointing out
that :
It is often a difficult question whether a tax imposed by a [s]tate does
in fact invade the domain of the [g]eneral government, or interfere
with its operations to such an extent ... as to render it unwarranted.
It cannot be said that a state tax which remotely affects the efficient
exercise of the [f]ederal power is for that reason alone inhibited by
the Constitution. To hold that would be to deny to the [s]tates all
power to tax persons or property.2 6
The Court concluded that the Constitution must be given a "practical con-
struction" so that its implied restrictions would not destroy the necessary
powers of the states.2 7 Quite logically, the test was said to be the effect of the
tax upon the federal agencies, "not upon the nature of the agents, or upon
the mode of their constitution, or upon the fact that they are agents . . . [but]
upon the question whether the tax does in truth deprive them of power to serve
23. Id. at 589. (Emphasis added.) ; see Baltimore Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v.
Baltimore, 195 U.S. 375 (1904) ; Transportation Co. v. Wheeling, 99 U.S. 273 (1878).
24. 85 U.S. 5 (1873).
25. Id. at 34.




the [G]overnment as they were intended to serve it, or does hinder the
efficient exercises of their power."
28
This "effect" test was generally followed2 9 and quite naturally blended
into the "economic burden" test set up by Panhandle Oil Co. v. Knox.80
The states may not burden or interfere with the exertion of national
power or make it a source of revenue or take the funds raised or tax
the means used for the performance of federal functions .... While
Mississippi may impose charges upon petitioner for the privilege of
carrying on trade that is subject to the power of the [s]tate, it may
not lay any tax upon transactions by which the United States
secures the things desired for its governmental purposes.
The validity of the taxes claimed is to be determined by the
practical effect of enforcement in respect of sales to the government.3 '
Later, the Court made it clear that the economic burden test did not preclude
a state tax on the privilege of doing business in the state. Although the court
reaffirmed such privilege taxes, it distinguished them, in theory, from taxes
on federal agencies or their income.
8 2
Today the privilege or excise tax may still be imposed by states, but
the economic burden test of exemption was abandoned by the Court in these
words:
The Government, rightly we think, disclaims any contention that the
Constitution . . . prohibits a tax extracted from contractors merely
because it is passed on economically ... as a part of the construction
cost to the Government. So far as such a non-discriminatory state
tax upon the contractor enters into the cost of the materials to the
Government, that is but a normal incident of the organization within
the same territory of two independent taxing sovereignities. The
asserted right of the one to be free of taxation by the other does not
spell immunity from paying the added costs attributable to the taxa-
tion of those who furnish supplies to the Government and who have
been granted no tax immunity. So far as a different view has pre-
vailed, see Panhandle Oil Co. v. Knox .... 83
In addition, the court established a test dependent upon where the legal inci-
dence of the tax falls: if on the government, immunity prevails; if on a private
party, that party is liable.8 The logic behind this test was that federal im-
28. Id. at 36.
29. See, e.g., Irwin v. Wright, 258 U.S. 219 (1922); Wheeling, P.&C. Transporta-
tion Co. v. City of Wheeling, 99 U.S. 273 (1878) ; Farmers' & Mechanics' Nat'l Bank v.
Dearing, 91 U.S. 29 (1875).
30. 277 U.S. 218 (1927).
31. Id. at 221-22. This case was reversed by Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U.S.
1 (1941).
32. Educational Films Corp. of America v. Ward, 282 U.S. 379 (1930).
33. Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1941).
34. Id. at 9.
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munity should be given practical application "so as to attain its purpose,
but without unnecessary interference with the right of taxation. It is personal
to the [G]overnment and is not transferrable to or to be used for the special
protection of the citizen."1
35
In 1949, the Supreme Court illustrated how narrow the exemption had
become by noting that the established exceptions to it included "a state tax on
the gross receipts of a contractor with the federal government... , a state tax
on the net income of such a contractor . . . , state sales and use taxes on
purchases of materials used by a contractor in performing a cost-plus contract
with the United States .... -36
More recent cases have gone even further. It is now well settled that
governmental immunity does not shield from state taxes private parties with
whom the Government does business, merely because part or all of the financial
burden will ultimately fall on the Government.3 7 Furthermore, it has been
implied that if the state tax is imposed on or measured by services38 rendered
to the federal government by a taxpayer, rather than on the property of the
Government, there is no federal immunity from taxation. This will hold true
even if there is an economic burden placed directly on the Government by
the tax.3 9
It is readily seen that the Supreme Court has gone from a philosophy of
applying the exemption whenever the federal government was even slightly
involved, to the position that there is no federal immunity from state taxation,
with few exceptions. Since the M'Culloch decision the Supreme Court has
failed to establish a clear and workable rule for exemption. Furthermore, the
many non-exempt areas at least make it clear that it is difficult for a taxpayer
to qualify for the immunity.
40
35. Ken Realty Co. v. Johnson, 138 F.2d 309, 310 (7th Cir. 1943).
36. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Texas Co., 336 U.S. 342, '359 (1949).
37. United States v. City of Detroit, 355 U.S. 466, 469 (1957).
38. There are services other than those rendered within governmental facilities.
39. Polar Ice Cream & Creamery Co. v. Andrews, 375 U.S. 361 (1.964).
40. See, Oklahoma State Tax Comm'n v. Texas Co., 336 U.S. 342 (1949). Property
owned and used by a private person in performing services for the federal government
was made subject to state and local taxes; Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306
U.S. 466 (1939) (income of federal employees was made subject to state taxation);
Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., 303 U.S. 376 (1938). Those operating under
government contracts or leases are subject to the same state taxes as similar businesses
without government contracts; Atkinson v. State Tax Comm'n, 302 U.S. 20 (1937). No
exemption was allowed for state income taxes on a private corporation merely because
the income was derived from federal contracts; Federal Compress & Warehouse Co. v.
McLean, 291 U.S. 17 (1934) (there was no exemption although the federal government
exerted regulatory control over the business) ; Alward v. Johnson, 282 U.S. 509 (1931)
(no exemption was allowed to an automotive stage line although it was carrying federal
mails) ; Mid-Northern Oil Co. v. Walker, 268 U.S. 45 (1925) (a lessee of federal lands
was held subject to an annual state license tax) ; St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. v. Niddle-
kamp, 256 U.S. 226 (1921). A corporation that operated a railroad under federal control
[Vol. 68
RECENT CASES
The only areas where an exemption clearly exists are where a taxpayer
is an agent for the federal government or where property is owned by the
federal government. It is submitted that these areas are extremely narrow
in nature.
41
Merely because the ultimate tax burden may be passed on to the federal
government in the form of higher costs, as is the result under the Pennsyl-
vania statute here involved,4 is no reason to grant immunity from taxation
to a private taxpayer.4 The courts have made it clear that the purpose of
federal immunity from taxation is not to give special benefits to certain
parties,44 but rather to preserve and protect valid functions of the federal
government, "[t] he power to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying
into execution the powers vested in Congress.
'45
With this policy in mind it is difficult to see how an electric company
can validly claim to fall under the federal exemption from taxation, merely
because it sold electricity to the federal government. Although it may increase
the cost of electricity, such a tax does not violate the purpose behind the doctrine
of federal immunity from state taxation.
GEORGE V. COHEN
and was profiting by its franchises, was made subject to a state franchise tax; Fidelity v.
Deposit Co. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 240 U.S. 319 (1916). A surety company
did not gain exemption as a federal instrumentality although it was executing bonds
required by a federal statute; Baltimore Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. City of Balti-
more, 195 U.S. 375 (1904). Land conveyed by the United States was not exempted from
state taxes although the United States reserved rights to use the land and had a forfeiture
clause; Central Pac. R.R. v. California, 162 U.S. 91 (1896). The state franchise of the
railroad was taxable by the state although the federal government held a mortgage;
In re State Tonnage Tax Cases, 79 U.S. 204 (1870) (privately, owned ships were
taxable although carrying federal cargo).
41. See cases cited supra note 39. See also Taber v. Indian Territory Illuminating
Co., 300 U.S. 1 (1937).
42. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 2181 (1962).
43. Graves v. New York State ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466 (1939). See, Kern-
Limerick v. Scurlock, 347 U.S. 110 (1953) ; Curry v. United States, 314 U.S. 14 (1941) ;
Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., 303 U.S. 376 (1938) ; Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal,
286 U.S. 123 (1932).
44. Ken Realty Co. v. Johnson, 138 F.2d 309 (7th Cir. 1943). See, Helvering v.
Mountain Producers Corp., 303 U.S. 376 (1938).
45. Carson v. Roane-Anderson Co., 342 U.S. 232, 234 (1951).
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